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apanese banks’ financial results for the Fiscal Year 
Ending (FYE) March 2009 marked their worst per-
formance in recent years, with the six major banks re-
porting a collective loss of nearly JPY1.2 trillion 
(USD12 billion).
i  Although soaring loan loss charges 
contributed to the banks’ weak performances, losses on 
equity securities were also a key driver.  These losses 
have drawn renewed attention to the practice of Japanese 
banks owning stock in the companies to which they lend 
through so-called “cross-shareholdings,” and the market 
risk resulting from these holdings.  Despite reducing 
cross-shareholdings since the early 1990s, banks still 
retain significant equity portfolios.  This Asia Focus pro-
vides a brief background on the development of cross-
shareholding and the elements of Japan’s regulatory sys-
tem that permit banks to hold equity securities.  The re-
port also examines some of the problems associated with 
shareholdings that Japanese banks have begun to face 
since the mid-1990s and considers measures that banks 
and the government have taken to unwind these share-
holdings. 
 
Cross-Shareholding: Background and Develop-
ment 
 
What is cross-shareholding? 
Broadly, cross-shareholding refers to a system of inter-
locking share ownership between Japanese companies.   
Most of these cross-shareholding relationships are be-
tween banks and their corporate customers.  Such rela-
tionships are relatively unique; furthermore, many coun-
tries restrict banks’ holdings of equity securities.  In the 
United States, for example, although banks are permitted 
to hold investment grade debt securities, with few excep-
tions they are prohibited from holding stocks as invest-
ment securities.
ii  In Japan, however, banks are permitted 
to hold up to 5% of outstanding shares in any single 
company, and many banks have used this arrangement as 
a means to solidify and strengthen ties with long-term 
clients.  In turn, these client companies have purchased 
shares in the banks from which they borrow, further 
strengthening ties and creating a network of cross-
shareholding. 
How and why did it develop? 
Cross-shareholding developed in the years during and 
immediately following the Allied occupation of Japan 
from 1945 to 1952.  Prior to World War II, large family-
controlled industrial conglomerates, the zaibatsu, were 
key features of the Japanese economic landscape.  The 
zaibatsu founding families maintained controlling inter-
ests in a horizontal network of subsidiary companies 
through ownership of a holding company; these subsidi-
aries came to dominate important sectors of Japan’s 
economy including banking, mining, iron and steel, and 
shipbuilding. 
 
Because Allied authorities blamed the zaibatsu for hav-
ing helped facilitate Japan’s war effort, a major thrust of 
occupational reform was the dissolution of the zaibatsu 
and the unwinding of the family-owned shareholdings.  
The Anti-Monopoly Law, passed in 1947, outlawed the 
formation of holding companies, prohibited non-
financial firms from owning shares in other companies, 
and limited financial firms’ ownership of other compa-
nies to 5% of outstanding shares.
iii  Occupation authori-
ties also expropriated and sold to the general public 
much of the stock that had been formerly held by zai-
batsu families and holding companies.  As a result of 
these reforms, the number of individual stockowners 
more than doubled between 1945 and 1949, and the per-
centage of outstanding shares held by companies fell 
from 51.9% to 5.5%.
iv 
 
Revisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 1949 and 1953 
removed the restriction on shareholding by non-financial 
firms, provided that such shareholdings did not restrain 
competition in a particular sector, and raised the 5% 
shareholding ceiling for financial firms to 10% (a 1977 
revision subsequently reduced this ceiling to 5% but had 
little effect on the steady increase in bank shareholding 
through the early 1990s).  These revisions enabled a 
gradual shift in the relative concentration of ownership 
of listed firms from individuals to financial institutions 
and businesses. In 1950, individuals owned 61.3% of 
shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, compared 
with 12.6% and 11% for financial institutions and busi-
ness corporations, respectively.  By the peak of the stock 
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businesses had increased their respective holdings to 46% 
and 25%, while individual holdings had fallen to 22.6% of 
outstanding shares (see Chart I).   
 
A number of factors contributed to the changing ownership 
composition of Japanese shareholdings.  Companies’ heavy 
reliance on bank finance during the period of high eco-
nomic growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s led to the 
formation of new industrial groups, the keiretsu, around the 
six largest city banks.
v  These banks typically provided 
keiretsu  member companies with their largest loans and 
held shares in the companies.  Equity ownership in borrow-
ing firms allowed the banks to strengthen relationships 
within the group and enhanced their ability to monitor 
lending and exercise corporate governance over borrowers.  
Group companies also acquired equity stakes in one an-
other, further solidifying inter-group ties. 
 
The government also contributed to the development of 
cross-shareholding networks.  Following the near collapse 
of several large securities companies in the mid-1960s, two 
government-backed institutions were established to help 
stabilize stock prices through the purchase of shares from 
securities companies and the market.  The purchased shares 
were frozen and later sold back on the market; they were 




Many firms eventually came to view these cross-
shareholding relationships as a means to protect themselves 
from unfriendly takeovers.
vii  Although the Anti-Monopoly 
Law limited shareholding by companies and banks in a 
single firm, intra-group shareholdings could be substan-
tially higher, making it difficult for outside investors to 
acquire controlling stakes in a company.  Because the 
banks and companies that comprised the cross-
shareholding network were considered stable shareholders 
unlikely to sell their shares, collectively these arrangements 
tied up significant amounts of outstanding stock.
viii   Such 
stable shareholders played an important role in allowing 
companies to take advantage of new equity issues during 
the 1970s and 1980s without diluting the ratio of cross-held 
shares. 
Bank Shareholding since the Mid-1990s 
Although cross-shareholding benefited both banks and 
associated companies for decades, this practice began to 
present challenges for banks in the mid-1990s.  The root 
of these challenges is the linkage that the shareholdings 
create between a bank’s financial health and the perform-
ance of the stock market.  Like other investors, banks 
gain from increases in the value of their equity portfolios 
and suffer losses from decreases.  One downside risk is 
that banks are required to record impairment charges for 
“permanent and substantial” declines in prices of the 
shares held in their equity portfolios, which directly re-
duces profits.
ix  In addition, the market value of a bank’s 
equity portfolio affects its capital levels.  Although risk-
based capital rules allow internationally active banks to 
include 45% of unrealized gains on equity securities to-
ward the calculation of Tier 2 capital, these rules also 
require Japanese banks to deduct from Tier 1 capital any 
unrealized valuation losses of any amount on equity se-
curities designated as “available-for-sale,” which include 
all cross-shareholdings.
x  Thus, stock market downturns 
usually hurt a bank’s profitability and capitalization, 
while upturns provide a direct boost. 
 
Challenges for Banks 
The downside risks of cross-shareholding were most 
clearly visible in the financial results announced by 
banks following periods of significant stock market de-
clines.  For FYE March 2003, for example, Japan’s six 
largest banks announced a combined net loss of JPY4.6 
trillion (USD38.4 billion).
xi  This loss was driven mainly 
by an increase in loan loss charges and impairments on 
equity portfolios that accompanied a 30% decline in the 
Nikkei 225 average between March 2002 and March 
2003.  More recently, for FYE March 2009 the descen-
dents of the same six banks reported net losses of 
JPY1.17 trillion (USD12 billion), their worst results 
since 2003.
xii  Although credit related costs also contrib-
uted to these losses, once again the banks suffered large 
stock impairment charges as global equity markets plum-
meted during the second half of 2008.  Japan’s three 
“megabanks” – Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 
(SMFG), Mizuho Financial Group (Mizuho), and Mitsu-
bishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG) – posted combined 
net losses on equity securities of JPY993 billion (USD10 
billion) and combined unrealized losses on equity securi-
ties of JPY356.5 billion (USD3.6 billion) (see Table I).
xiii 
 
Anticipating the losses for FYE March 2009, the Bank of 
Japan’s (BOJ) 2009 Financial System Report identified 
the market risk associated with stockholdings and the 
reduction of this risk for the overall banking sector over 
the long term as an ongoing and “very important” mana-
gerial challenge for Japanese banks.  The BOJ noted fur-
ther that nearly two-thirds of major banks recorded de-
clines in Tier I capital as a result of unrealized losses on 


















Companiesthat approximately 20% of these banks experienced Tier I 
declines of 10% or greater.
xiv 
 
Responding to the Challenges 
Liquidating shareholdings through sales is the most direct 
way for Japanese banks to minimize the risk posed by ex-
posure to equity markets, and banks have used this ap-
proach to reduce net equity investments since the mid-
1990s.  But liquidation through sales can be somewhat 
problematic for a number of reasons.  For example, banks 
may in some cases be reluctant to unwind shareholdings in 
firms with which they have long-term business ties because 
doing so could damage these relationships.  Yet even in 
cases where banks are willing to sell shares, the Japanese 
government fears that the sudden sale of large amounts of 
bank-held stocks could depress share values and adversely 
impact equity markets and the economy as a whole. 
 
Accordingly, the Japanese government has taken a number 
of actions in recent years to help banks reduce sharehold-
ings while minimizing the impact of such reductions on 
financial markets.  Each of these actions has followed sud-
den and substantial market downturns that have occurred 
during the past decade and contributed to weak financial 
results among Japanese banks.  Between March 2000 and 
March 2001 the Nikkei fell from 20,000 to 13,000, losing 
36% of its total value (see Chart II).  In response, the gov-
ernment implemented a law in November 2001 that re-
quired banks to reduce their stock holdings to 100% of 
their Tier I capital by 2004 (this date was later extended to 
2006).
xv  To prevent sales of shares by banks from placing 
additional downward pressure on already declining stock 
prices, the law also created the Banks’ Shareholding Pur-
chase Corporation (BSPC) in January 2002 and enabled it 




Following another significant stock price decline that 
began in May 2002, the BOJ announced a complemen-
tary program in September 2002 aimed at helping banks 
reduce equity holdings.  Under this stock purchasing 
plan, the BOJ agreed to buy up to JPY2 trillion 
(USD16.3 billion) in stocks from banks whose equity 
holdings exceeded their Tier I capital through end-
September 2003 and hold the purchased stocks through 
end-September 2007.  The BOJ later increased its pur-
chase ceiling to JPY3 trillion (USD 24.5 billion) and 
extended the purchase program through end-September 
2004. 
 
Between 2002 and 2006, the BSPC and BOJ purchased a 
combined total of JPY3.8 trillion (USD 31 billion) in 
stocks from banks.  Banks also conducted sales inde-
pendent of the government to reduce their stockholdings 
below their Tier 1 capital levels in line with the govern-
ment’s 2006 deadline.
xvii  During roughly this same pe-
riod, the value of shareholding by the six city and 64 
regional banks fell by 34%, from JPY25.9 trillion to JPY 
17.1 trillion (USD211.3 billion to USD139.5 billion, see 
  Table I: Mega Banks' Unrealized and Net Gains/Losses on Equity Holdings  














Unrealized Gains/Losses on Equity Securities (JPY billions) – After Tax Impact on Tier 1 Capital 
MUFG  -179.8  1,378.0  3,221.3  2,980.8  1,348.3  1,143.9  -609.2 
SMFG  7.0  936.2  1,972.6  1,702.7  705.0  669.8  -165.4 
Mizuho  -183.7  253.3  2,693.8  2,462.4  1,109.6  884.6  -190.6 
TOTAL  -356.5  2,567.5  7,887.7  7,145.9  3,162.9  2,698.3  -965.2 
Net Gains/Losses on Equity Securities (JPY billions) – Direct Impact on Net Income 
MUFG  -408.8  -24.9  127.1  60.9  -186.5  237.7  -997.4 
SMFG  -183.7  -7.0  44.7  47.1  -101.9  101.5  -621.5 
Mizuho  -400.2  253.3  -109.6  231.5  210.4  190.8  -925.0 
TOTAL  -992.7  221.4  62.2  339.5  -78.0  530.0  -2,543.9 
Annual Percent Change in the Nikkei 225 Average (end-March) 
Annual Change in Nikkei 
225 Average (end-March) 
-35.2%  -27.5%  1.3%  46.2%  -0.4%  47.0%  -27.7% 










Chart II: Nikkei 225 Average (end of Month)
Source: Bank ofJapan 
Declines preceeding government actionChart III).
xviii This reduction in shareholding helped ad-
dress the market risk exposure associated with banks’ re-
maining stockholdings, and a sustained recovery in the 
Japanese stock market from mid-2003 to late-2007 appears 
to have lessened pressure on banks to make continued re-
ductions during that period.  Accordingly, in October 2007 
the BOJ began scheduled sales of the stocks it had acquired 
from banks under the share purchase program.  The BOJ 
suspended the sales only a year later, however, after the 
Nikkei average fell by 45% through October 2008.  As 
stock prices continued to decline into 2009 and the end of 
banks’ fiscal year approached, in February 2009 the BOJ 
announced a resumption of its stock purchase plan for 
banks whose stockholdings exceed 50% of Tier I capital. 
Then in March 2009, the BSPC announced that it would 
restart purchases of bank-held stocks through October 
2009.  As of late July 2009, the BOJ had purchased some 
JPY30 billion (USD308.4 million) in stocks from banks 
under the plan and the BSPC had purchased nearly JPY137 
billion (USD 1.14 billion), further reducing banks’ market 
risk.
xix  However, it remains to be seen what effect the 30% 
plus rebound in the Nikkei average since both measures’ 
announcement will have on banks’ desire to participate in 
either share purchase program going forward. 
 
Conclusion 
Measures implemented by Japanese banks and the govern-
ment have been successful in reducing the overall level of 
bank shareholdings and the market risk associated with 
those holdings.  The BOJ’s resumption of its stock pur-
chase program early this year signals the government’s 
willingness to continue to support bank efforts to liquidate 
shareholdings.  Moreover, Japan’s Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) has publicly encouraged banks to take ad-
vantage of the BSPC program and will reportedly begin to 
require Japanese banks to disclose the value of and reasons 
for any cross-shareholdings.
xx  But it remains unclear 
whether the recent rebound in Japanese stock prices will 
lessen the immediacy of government efforts to reduce 
banks’ shareholdings further.  Past patterns suggest that 
further reductions will likely be gradual in the absence of 
new regulatory restrictions or another sharp decline in eq-
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uity markets.  It is therefore likely—as the BOJ has 
stated—that cross-shareholdings and the accompanying 
market risk will remain significant challenges for Japanese 

























Chart III: Japanese Bank Stockholding
City Banks
Regional Banks
Source: Bank of Japan